60 ideas
17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |