67 ideas
12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |