Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula' and 'Elements of Geometry'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

26 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
8623 Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
13907 If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
6297 Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
9603 An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
9894 A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
8738 Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
22278 Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid]
8673 Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend]
10250 Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid]
10302 Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays]
14157 Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
1600 Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]