Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Objects and Persons' and 'De Anima'

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84 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]
The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]
If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]
Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle]
Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle]
Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle]
Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares]
Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle]
Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle]
Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle]
The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle]
If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle]
What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle]
The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle]
Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle]
If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks]
Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle]
Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle]
Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle]
Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]