59 ideas
| 21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
| 21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
| 3519 | Man uses his body, so must be separate from it [Anon (Plat), by Maslin] |
| 21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
| 21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
| 21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
| 21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
| 21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
| 21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
| 21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
| 21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
| 21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
| 21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
| 21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
| 21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
| 21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
| 21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
| 21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
| 21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
| 21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
| 21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
| 21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
| 21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
| 21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
| 21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
| 21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
| 21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |