90 ideas
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
1466 | Claims about God don't seem to claim or deny anything tangible, so evidence is irrelevant [Flew, by PG] |
1465 | You can't claim a patch of land is tended by a 'gardener' if there is no evidence, and all counter-evidence is rejected [Flew, by PG] |
1467 | Religious people seem unwilling to accept any evidence that God does not love us, so their claim is unfalsifiable [Flew, by PG] |