98 ideas
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
| 5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
| 22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
| 20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
| 22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
| 23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
| 22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
| 22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
| 22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
| 23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
| 22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
| 18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
| 23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
| 5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
| 5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
| 5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
| 5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
| 22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
| 22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
| 23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
| 23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
| 23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
| 23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
| 23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
| 5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
| 23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
| 23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
| 23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
| 23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
| 5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
| 5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
| 5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |