114 ideas
| 2930 | The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche] |
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 20143 | Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche] |
| 23722 | Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche] |
| 4417 | Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 23715 | Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 4421 | Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche] |
| 23719 | Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche] |
| 4420 | There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 4414 | Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 4419 | People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
| 3793 | We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche] |
| 4408 | The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche] |
| 23716 | A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche] |
| 20129 | All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche] |
| 4409 | Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche] |
| 3259 | Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel] |
| 4416 | Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche] |
| 4418 | A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche] |
| 4407 | Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche] |
| 4415 | Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche] |
| 23718 | If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche] |
| 23717 | Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche] |
| 23721 | Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche] |
| 20142 | The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche] |
| 23720 | Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 4410 | The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche] |