93 ideas
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
| 5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
| 5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
| 21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
| 5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
| 5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
| 5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
| 5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
| 5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
| 5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
| 5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
| 5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
| 5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
| 5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
| 5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
| 5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
| 5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
| 5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
| 5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
| 17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
| 5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
| 5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
| 5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
| 5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
| 5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
| 5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
| 5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
| 5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
| 5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
| 5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
| 5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
| 5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
| 5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |