51 ideas
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |