66 ideas
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |