24 ideas
9921 | 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen] |
9924 | Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen] |
9933 | The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen] |
9928 | Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen] |
9926 | A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen] |
9932 | The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen] |
9923 | We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen] |
9925 | Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen] |
9934 | Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen] |
16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
9918 | Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen] |
9929 | Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen] |
9927 | Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen] |
9930 | Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen] |
16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
1799 | If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius] |
9919 | The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen] |
9922 | If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen] |