Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chapters on Scepticism', 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula' and 'Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
1799 If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
12157 Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
20346 The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
18547 Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
20408 With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
20409 When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
20411 Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
22711 The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
4025 Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
20412 Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
22046 The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
21458 The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
5643 Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
20410 The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]