Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Senses', 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences' and 'Logical Necessity'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15148 Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
15145 A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15147 Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
20921 How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
15144 Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
15146 Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15151 Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]