Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo', 'fragments/reports' and 'Science without Numbers'

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42 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H]
Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H]
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon]
To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H]