114 ideas
| 21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
| 23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
| 20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
| 23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
| 15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
| 21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
| 21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
| 21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
| 9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
| 9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
| 9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
| 9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
| 9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
| 10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
| 3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
| 10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
| 10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
| 9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
| 10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
| 10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
| 10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
| 9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
| 22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
| 22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
| 23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
| 8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
| 23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
| 22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
| 23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
| 23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
| 23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
| 22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
| 22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
| 7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
| 5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
| 23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
| 21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
| 5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
| 21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
| 21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
| 21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
| 21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
| 21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
| 20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
| 22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
| 4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
| 21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
| 21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |