34 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |