40 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
23755 | Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil] |
9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
23747 | What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
23756 | The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil] |
9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
23758 | Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
23760 | All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil] |
23748 | The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil] |
23759 | Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil] |
23762 | Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
23750 | It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil] |
23749 | The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil] |
23753 | People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil] |
23751 | Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil] |
23752 | Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil] |
23757 | The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil] |
23761 | Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil] |
23764 | The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil] |
23763 | Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
23754 | The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil] |