Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)', 'works' and 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]