14 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |