Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Defeasibility Theory', 'Meno' and 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
1922 Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6253 Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
11259 How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20219 True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
5985 Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
5986 The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
1923 As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
1919 You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6256 Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
6252 Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
1913 Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
1921 If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
1927 It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
1916 Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]
1918 How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
6257 You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
6254 We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
6255 Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]