19 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |