Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Human Nature', 'fragments/reports' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes]