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All the ideas for 'Of Liberty and Necessity', 'Critique of Practical Reason' and 'Thinking About Logic'

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77 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant]
The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant]
Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant]
Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant]
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant]
Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant]
From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant]