42 ideas
| 6211 | Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes] |
| 23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
| 23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
| 23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
| 23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
| 23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
| 23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
| 6213 | A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes] |
| 6208 | Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 6209 | There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes] |
| 6210 | Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes] |
| 6212 | Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |