83 ideas
17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
10486 | If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath] |
8485 | We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |