Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws)' and 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic''

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
16415 Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
16413 Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
13886 Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
9845 We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
10019 Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
16416 The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
9886 Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
9889 Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10553 A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett]
10020 Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
9887 Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett]
8751 Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9891 The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
5163 Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
5167 The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9890 The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
11846 If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
5168 Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]