20 ideas
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |