19 ideas
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
15571 | The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
15581 | Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger] |