15 ideas
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
7906 | When the Buddha reached the highest level of insight, he could detect no self in the world [Ashvaghosha] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
7904 | The first stage of trance is calm amidst applied and discursive thinking [Ashvaghosha] |
7905 | The Buddha sought ultimate reality and the final goal of existence in his meditations [Ashvaghosha] |