9 ideas
| 4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
| 8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |