10 ideas
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
| 12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |