15 ideas
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
| 3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
| 4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
| 22022 | Beauty motivates morality, by harmonising feeling and reason [Schiller, by Pinkard] |
| 7675 | Schiller speaks obsessively of freedom throughout his works [Schiller, by Berlin] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |