8 ideas
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |