16 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |