60 ideas
| 23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
| 3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
| 3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
| 3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
| 23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
| 23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
| 3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
| 20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
| 22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
| 22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
| 23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
| 3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
| 3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
| 3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
| 23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
| 3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
| 3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
| 3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
| 23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
| 23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
| 23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
| 23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
| 23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
| 23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
| 23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
| 23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
| 23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
| 23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
| 23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
| 23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
| 23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
| 23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
| 23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
| 23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
| 23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
| 3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
| 23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
| 3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
| 3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
| 23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
| 3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
| 3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
| 3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
| 3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
| 3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
| 3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
| 3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
| 23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
| 23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |