16 ideas
15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |