Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


90 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt]
The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle]
Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle]
What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle]