56 ideas
8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |