24 ideas
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |