12 ideas
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |