32 ideas
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |