13 ideas
12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |