34 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
12695 | Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
12705 | Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |