37 ideas
| 4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
| 14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
| 4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
| 4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
| 4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
| 4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
| 4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
| 4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
| 4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
| 4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
| 4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
| 4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
| 4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
| 4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
| 4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
| 4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
| 23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
| 4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
| 14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
| 14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
| 14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
| 14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
| 14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
| 14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
| 14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
| 14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
| 11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
| 4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
| 4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
| 23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
| 23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
| 4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |