18 ideas
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |