Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power', 'What Numbers Could Not Be' and 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


42 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf]
Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C]
A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf]
To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf]
Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf]
The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend]
No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe]
If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf]
The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf]
The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf]
Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf]
Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf]
How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]