Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Infinitism solution to regress problem' and 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8833 Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
16489 Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16490 Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
16488 It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8834 Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8838 If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8839 Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
16491 If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
4786 Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]