23 ideas
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |