Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Plural Quantification Exposed' and 'Epistemological Disjunctivism'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19504 My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
10779 A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10781 A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10783 Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
10778 Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
10782 The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19505 Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19499 We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
19500 Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
19502 Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19498 Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19506 Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
19496 Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
19497 Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19495 Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
19501 We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19507 Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]